This paper uses Shannon's information theory to give a quantitative definition of information flow in systems that transform inputs to outputs. For deterministic systems, the definition is shown to specialize to a simpler form when the information source and the known inputs jointly determine all inputs uniquely. For this special case, the definition is related to the classical security condition of non-interference and an equivalence is established between non-interference and independence of random variables. Quantitative information flow for deterministic systems is then presented in relational form. With this presentation, it is shown how relational parametricity can be used to derive upper and lower bounds on information flows through families of functions defined in the second-order lambda calculus.
Introduction
The general aim of our research is to provide a quantitative analysis of the information flows within computational systems. The original motivation for this work lies in a security setting (specifically issues relating to confidentiality). Much research in this area in recent years has focused on noninterference properties [16, 23, 17] (see [30] for a wide-ranging survey of literature in this and related areas). Roughly speaking, non-interference is said to hold when the behaviour of a system as observed by unauthorized users is invariant with respect to variation of the confidential inputs and data maintained by the system. More general work uses relations (in particular, equivalence relations) to capture different classes of observation and categories of input (see [19, 31] ; see also Section 5 below).
The need for a quantitative approach arises naturally when we consider situations in which noninterference fails to hold between parts of a system, and we ask how much information flows between them. This applies, for example, in the construction of programs designed to maintain access control policies. It is well known, by bankers and systems administrators among others, that acceptable access control can be achieved in spite of allowing opportunities to guess PINs and passwords. However, such systems violate non-interference, because observation of the success or failure of a login attempt is clearly not invariant with respect to variations in the password database. Furthermore, the non-interference security community is aware of limitations of non-interference [29] . Since real programs often do leak confidential information [44] it seems sensible to try to measure that leakage as best we can. To date, we have shown that the idea is feasible [5] , and have described an implementable analysis for a While language which handles loops, branching, equality tests and arithmetic expressions [6, 7] .
We note two related limitations of the work presented in this paper. Relaxing these limitations is the subject of ongoing work.
First, we ignore any intermediate states in programs and consider systems which simply transform inputs into outputs. The definitions in Section 3 apply to any system treated in this way, irrespective of the language in which it is written. Examples may be written in a While language, or some functional language such as PCF or Haskell. The key thing is that the semantics of the system considered is a transformation of inputs to outputs. We refer to such systems as transformational systems (see Section 3.1 for the formal definition). At this level of abstraction it is clearly not possible to talk about timing issues or to deal adequately with reactive systems.
Second, we assume that our transformational systems define total mappings on finite spaces. We do not regard the restriction to finite primitive datatypes, such as -bit twos-complement integers, to be a major handicap, since these are precisely the datatypes used in many programming languages. But the inability to deal directly with non-termination and unbounded structured types, such as lists and trees, is obviously unsatisfactory.
Overview
Section 2 summarizes the basic definitions and notation we require from Shannon's information theory. In Section 3 information theory is used to give a quantitative definition of information flow in transformational systems. The definition is shown to specialize to a simpler form for deterministic systems when the information source and the known inputs jointly determine all inputs uniquely. In Section 4, quantitative information flow is related to the classical security condition of non-interference and an equivalence is established between non-interference and independence of random variables. In Section 5, the quantitative definition of information flow is presented in relational form for deterministic systems. With this presentation, it is shown in Section 6 how relational parametricity can be used to derive upper and lower bounds on information flows through families of functions defined in the second-order lambda calculus.
The remainder of the current section discusses related work.
Related work
Non-interference is a property guaranteeing the absence of unwanted information flows in a software system. This idea was given a formal definition by Goguen and Messeguer in 1982 [16] within the context of a discussion of security policies. Since that time the study of non-interference has been of ongoing interest to the security and programming language design and analysis communities. In the last decade or so there has been significant activity around the question of how to construct programs that demonstrably have the non-interference property. Two approaches have been an a priori one via type systems and an a posteriori one via program analysis. Volpano and Smith have successfully applied a types based approach to a variety of systems [42, 39, 40, 34] . Examples of work that use the program analysis approach include Bodei's work with the Nielsens [2] , Malacaria and Hankin's work using control flow analysis via games [21] , Clark, Hankin and Hunt's application of flow logic to idealized Algol [4] .
Our work, in contrast, is concerned with using information theoretic quantities to measure the amount of the flow of information caused by interference between inputs and outputs.
What little there is of the early work in this area refers to state-based systems. One precursor is that of Denning in the early 1980s. [11] gives examples that contain a few basic intuitions about information theoretic measures of information flow through imperative program constructs and also proposes an information theoretic definition for measuring interference between program variables evaluated at two different program points × and × ¼ :
This formula is intended to measure the flow of information from Ü into Ý as the result of any changes to Ý along the program execution from × to × ¼ . The meaning of the formula is as follows (see Section 2 for the formal definitions): it measures the difference between an observer's uncertainty about the value of Ü at ×, given knowledge of the value of Ý at ×, and the observer's uncertainty about the value which Ü had at ×, after observing the value of Ý on reaching × ¼ . As discussed in [8] , this definition is quite closely related to our definition of information flow (see Section 3.2) but is actually incorrect.
Other, closely related work, earlier than ours, is that of McLean and Gray. McLean presented a very general flow model in [23] , related to Sutcliffe's approach to information flow in [36] . On the basis of this flow model, McLean gave a probabilistic definition of security (with respect to flows) of a system. Gray presented a less general and more detailed elaboration of McLean's flow model in [17] , making an explicit connection with information theory through his definition of the channel capacity of flows between confidential and non-confidential variables.
Although our work is the only such that measures the amount of information (in an information theoretic sense) that flows along channels of interference in a program, other researchers have recently taken quantitative approaches to information flow.
In [26] Di Pierro, Hankin and Wiklicky define probabilistic measures on flows in a probabilistic concurrent constraint setting where the interference comes via probabilistic operators. They use this to derive a quantitative measure of the similarity between agents written in this probabilistic concurrent constraint language, however in contrast to our work they do not measure quantities of information. Gavin Lowe has measured information flow in CSP by counting refusals [20] and Volpano and Smith have relaxed strict non-interference and developed type systems in which a well typed program will not leak its secret in polynomial time [41] .
Information and conditional information
In this section we introduce the quantity we intend to measure: the amount of information that flows from (part of) the input to (part of) the output and we show how this flow is dependent on the likelihood of a particular input occurring, i.e. on the probability distribution on the inputs. To do this we use Shannon's information theory [33] . Shannon's measures are based on a logarithmic measure of the unexpectedness, or surprise, inherent in a probabilistic event. An event which occurs with some non-zero probability Ô is regarded as having a 'surprisal value' of ÐÓ ½ Ô . Intuitively, surprise is inversely proportional to likelihood. The base for ÐÓ may be chosen freely but it is conventional to use base 2 (the rationale for using a logarithmic measure is given in [33] ). The total information carried by a set of Ò events is then taken as the weighted sum of their surprisal values:
Ô is defined to be 0). This quantity is variously known as the self-information or entropy of the set of events.
It is not easy to give reliable intuitions about the meaning of this definition. Ultimately, this formal notion of information is properly understood through Shannon's coding theorems. The basic idea of coding is a follows. Suppose we wish to record or transmit a message specifying which of the Ò events has occurred. By clever choice of representation we wish to minimize the average space consumed by the message: this minimum is À. In the simplest case, if we have ¾ events, each equally likely, it is clear that we will require bits, and it is easily verified that indeed À in this case. This case actually turns out to be the worst case: for any other distribution, À . The reason is that we can optimize our representation so that it generates longer messages for less likely events and shorter ones for more likely events. When this idea is properly formalized it turns out that À is, in fact, the expected length in bits for any optimal encoding. A very clear account of these ideas is given in [37] .
In what follows we generally use the language of random variables rather than talk directly about distributions. For our purposes, a random variable is a surjective map Ế µ, where is a finite set with a specified probability distribution and Ê´ µ is the (necessarily finite) range of . (We note that the term random variable is more conventionally reserved for maps into the reals, with maps of our form being known as discrete random elements.) For the remainder of this section, let and its probability distribution be fixed, identically for all random variables under discussion.
For each ¾ , we write Ô´ µ for its probability. We adopt the following conventions for random variables: again, we use the more verbose form where necessary to avoid confusion.
The entropy of a random variable is denoted À´ µ and is defined, in accordance with (2.1), as:
Note that, for the purposes of calculating entropy, the only relevant characteristic of is its set of inverse images, since Ô´Üµ is just the sum in of the probabilities of the elements of ½´Ü µ. If two maps and are similar in this respect, we write ³ ; formally:
It is easily verified that if ³ then À´ µ À´ µ.
Another basic definition which will be used is that of conditional entropy À´ µ measuring the uncertainty in given knowledge of . It is defined as
(We follow standard practice in suppressing the pairing brackets within information measures; thus À´ µ is shorthand for À´ µ, etc.) Information theory provides a more general way of measuring the extent to which information may be shared between two sets of observations. Given two random variables and , the mutual information between and , written Á´ µ is defined as follows:
This quantity is a direct measure of the amount of information carried by which can be learned by observing (or vice versa). As with entropy, there are conditional versions of mutual information. The mutual information between and given knowledge of , written Á´ µ, may be defined as
For more detail on the above fundamental definitions of information theory, see [33, 9] .
Quantifying information flow
In this section we start by defining a measure of information flow appropriate in a quite general computational setting. We go on to consider the special case of flows in deterministic systems (allowing a purely functional semantics) where all inputs are accounted for, and show how the general definition simplifies in this case.
Transformational systems
A transformational system Ë is specified by the following:
1. Ë -a finite set; 2. a probability distribution on Ë ; 3. a random variable Á Ë Ë ẾÁ Ë µ which defines the inputs of the system; 4. a random variable Ç Ë Ë ẾÇ Ë µ which defines the outputs of the system. Note that, in any real system of interest, we would expect the outputs of the system to be determined, to some extent, by the inputs, and so Á Ë and Ç Ë will not normally be independent. Note also that we could, without loss of generality, fix Ë as Ê´Á Ë µ ¢ ẾÇ Ë µ, taking Á Ë and Ç Ë to be the first and second projections, respectively. However, it is technically convenient not to do this, especially in the case of purely deterministic systems.
Given a transformational system Ë, we are concerned with two classes of observation:
An input observation is a surjective map
An output observation is a surjective map Ê´Ç Ë µ Ế µ. 
Observations induce random variables

Examples
In the following, let AE be some finite subset of the integers, such as those representable in a -bit twos-complement representation.
1. Consider the system defined by the swap function ´Ü Ýµ ´Ý Üµ restricted to AE ¢AE. In this case it is natural to take Ë to be AE ¢ AE and Á Ë to be the identity. Given a probability distribution on AE ¢AE, we then have a transformational system where Á Ë is the identity and Ç Ë is just swap. In this case we also have Ê´Ç Ë µ AE ¢ AE Ê´Á Ë µ. Possible input and output observations include the projections ½ ¾ . 2. Consider terminating programs written in a simple imperative language defined over a finite set of variables Var and containing a Ó Ò operator, which evaluates randomly to 0 or 1 with equal probability. Let ¦ Var AE . Assume given a probability distribution on input states ¾ ¦,
writing Ô´ µ for the probability that the input state is . 
The obvious input and output observations to consider in this setting are projections on the state, that is, observations of the values of one or more program variables. For any program variable Ü, the corresponding observation is given by ´Üµ.
Information flow
We are interested in flows of information from system inputs to system outputs. We use some input observation Ê´Á Ë µ Ê´ µ and output observation Ê´Ç Ë µ Ê´ µ, as defined in Section 3.1, to pick out the parts of the input and output we wish to focus on. In this context, we refer to as the information source. In the rest of this section, assume given some transformational system Ë.
A natural information-theoretic quantity to view as the flow from to is the mutual information between the two corresponding random variables: Á´ Ò ÓÙØ µ. We say this seems natural because it is a direct formalization of the idea that the quantity of information flowing from to is the amount of information given by input observation which is shared with output observation .
However, despite its intuitive appeal, this formalisation is flawed as it stands. To see why, consider the following case:
ÜÓÖ (true when exactly one of the arguments is true) with and independent random variables uniformly distributed over the Booleans. Since is the value of a function with argument , and since variation in clearly can cause variation in , we might expect the presence of an information flow from to , But this is not shown in Á´ µ; indeed we have We therefore modify our definition of information flow thus. Let and be input observations, let be an output observation. Then we define the information flow from to given knowledge of as
There are two natural questions arising from this basic definition:
What is the meaning of ´ µ ¼ ? This captures the special case when no information flows from to . In Corollary 1 we show that, in the deterministic case, this is equivalent to the standard notion of non-interference between and (provided , constitute the whole input). What is the meaning of
First, what is the maximum value Ò can take, i.e. how much information is initially 'undiscovered'? One of the basic information theoretic inequalities is Á´Í Î Ï µ Ñ Ò´À´Í Ï µ À´Î Ï µµ. So we know that, whatever the details of how the system transforms inputs to outputs, and whatever the choice of output observation, Ò À´ Ò Ò µ. When Ò achieves this maximum, the observation is revealing everything: all the undiscovered information in is flowing to . When Ò falls short of the maximum, the observation is incomplete, leaving´À´ Ò Ò µ Òµ bits of information still unknown. One possible operational interpretation of this 'gap' is that it provides a measure of how hard it remains to guess the actual value of once is known. This is formalized in [22] (note, however, that this 'guessing game' is an idealized one in which it is assumed that the encoding of information about in is invertible in constant time; it has nothing to say about the computational difficulty of recovering knowledge of from when this does not hold).
Deterministic information flow
We now restrict attention to the case of deterministic systems, by which we mean systems for which there exists a function such that Ç Ë AE Á Ë . This will be the case, for example, in systems defined by programs written in a simple imperative language (without non-deterministic constructs) or in a functional language (see Section 6). Now consider flows of the form ´ µ in the special case that observations and jointly determine the inputs, i.e. is injective on inputs, or, equivalently, Ò ³ Á Ë . For example, in a security setting we may be interested in flows of the form Ä´À Äµ where program variables are partitioned into the high-security set (input observation À) and the low-security set (input observation Ä). Such a flow measures what a low-security observer (who can only observe low-security variables) can learn about high-security inputs as a result of information flow into the low-security outputs. Since À Äpartition the set of all program variables they jointly provide a complete observation of the input.
As shown by the following proposition, this special case allows a simplified definition of flow:
Assume a deterministic system Ë. and define ´Üµ and ´Ýµ and let be any input observation. Clearly, no information flows from to , since the value assigned to Ý does not depend on any part of the store. This is confirmed using (3.1), which gives a flow of Á´ Ò ÓÙØ Ò µ ¼ (one of the basic identities of information theory, since Ò and ÓÙØ are independent). By contrast, applying (3.2)
would give a flow of À´ ÓÙØ Ò µ À´ ÓÙØ µ
Another striking difference between the specialized setting and the more general probabilistic setting, is that in the specialized case an upper bound on the flow into a collection of outputs can be determined by considering the outputs separately.
PROPOSITION 3.2
Let Ë be a deterministic system. Let and be input observations. Let ½ and ¾ be output observations and let ½ ¾ (thus is also an output observation). If is injective on inputs then
PROOF. By Proposition 3.1, it suffices to establish the general inequality
It is easy to show (for example, by Venn diagram, see [45] ) that À´ µ À´ µ · À´ µ Á´ µ. Since all of the Shannon measures are non-negative, the inequality follows.
But the conclusion of this proposition does not hold in general when the injectiveness condition is dropped. The reason is essentially the one used to motivate the use of conditional mutual information in the definition of flow in Section 3.2: knowledge of one input can increase the apparent flow from another. Consider the program ´Ü Þµ ´Ü ÜÓÖ Þ Þ µ defining a deterministic system with Ê´Á Ë µ Ê´Ç Ë µ bool ¢ bool. Let and be the input observations ½ and ¾ , respectively. Similarly, let ½ ¾ be the output observations ½ ¾ . Now suppose the distribution for Ë is such that Ò and Ò are independent and uniform. We are concerned with flows having as the information source. Instead of taking as the observer's prior knowledge (which would satisfy the injectiveness condition of the proposition) take some constant function Ï (representing ignorance), in which case, injectiveness clearly fails. Conditioning on a constant has no effect, thus Á´ Ò ÓÙØ Ï Ò µ Á´ Ò ÓÙØ µ, hence Ï´ µ Á´ Ò ÓÙØ µ. Simple calculations then give the following:
So in this case it is not sufficient to calculate the flows to the outputs separately. The reason is clear: the two outputs are, respectively, a perfect encryption of and its key. Observing either one by itself reveals nothing about but observing both reveals everything.
Non-interference
In this section we consider only deterministic systems Ë and we assume that the inputs and outputs are structured as vectors, whose elements we refer to as the components (equivalently, we may take inputs and outputs to be finite maps whose domains index the components, as in the case of the store for a simple imperative language). Thus we are assuming the existence of a set of input observations Ò , and similarly for output observations. In the setting of security, information flow is of particular relevance when considering confidentiality properties. Leakage of confidential information is a particular case of information flow where the source of information is a high-security part of the input and the target a low-security part of the output. In general when there is information flow from inputs to outputs, the inputs are said to interfere with the outputs, whereas the absence of any such flow is known as non-interference. One attraction of non-interference is its relative simplicity, since it is a binary property which can be defined without any explicit recourse to information theory [16] . Roughly speaking, a deterministic program is said to satisfy non-interference if its low-security outputs depend only on its low-security inputs (hence not on its high-security inputs).
More formally, in the deterministic case, a generalized definition of non-interference can be formalized by modelling different categories of observation (e.g. high-security, low-security) by equivalence relations. Given relations Ê and Ë, a function is said to map Ê into Ë, written
In what follows, Ê and Ë will always be equivalence relations, though the general construction (known as logical relations [35, 27] ) does not require this. Given a set of components , let be the equivalence relation which relates two inputs just when they agree on all components in . Suppose that the input (resp. output) components are partitioned into the low security components Ä (resp. Ä ¼ ) and the high-security components À (resp. À ¼ ). Then non-interference is defined as ´ Ä µ µ´ Ä ¼ µ ('low-equivalence' is mapped into 'low-equivalence'). More generally, a collection of input components interferes with an output component iff In Section 5 we show how our quantitative approach to information flow can also be expressed in this relational form. Here we go on to explore the relationship between non-interference and information theory.
Non-interference and independence
First recall that two random variables and are independent iff for all Ü Ý È´ Ü Ýµ È´ ÜµÈ´ Ýµ. An immediate consequence of the definition is that for two independent random variables and , À´ µ À´ µ · À´ µ, which provides a proof for the following:
Random variables and are independent iff Á´ µ ¼ . 
Relational information flow
In this section we begin by observing the (standard) correspondence between equivalence relations and surjective maps. We go on to explore how this correspondence can be used to derive a relational presentation of information for deterministic transformational systems.
Equivalence relations and surjective maps
As observed in Section 2, random variables with identical sets of inverse images necessarily have the same entropy. Intuitively, the reason ³ implies À´ µ À´ µ is that, in this case, and capture exactly the same observation, modulo some possible encoding differences: when we observe Ü, what we 'really' discover is just that the input (in ) belongs to ½´Ü µ. Thus effectively partitions the underlying space into sets whose elements are indistinguishable by an observer who only sees the value of . We can state this relationally. Given Ế µ, the kernel of is defined to be the equivalence relation Ö´ µ on , defined thus:
The inverse images of are the equivalence classes of Ö´ µ, hence:
Conversely, any equivalence relation Ê on a set induces an obvious surjective map from onto its quotient by Ê. We write Êfor the set of equivalence classes of wrt Ê and we write Ê for the Ê-equivalence class
We write the quotient map for Ê as Ê Ê. Clearly, Ö´ Ê µ Ê.
We note that the above correspondences form the basis of the work presented in [19] , which explicitly identifies the informal notion of information with the formal one of equivalence relations. However, that work is not quantitative and makes no use of information theory.
Equivalence relations and information flow
For the rest of this section assume given a deterministic transformational system Ë in which Ç Ë AE Á Ë . Let Ê´Á Ë µ, thus Ế µ, with finite. Now, given an equivalence relation Ê on , we may define a corresponding random variable:
Similarly, given Ë on Ê´ µ, we define:
Where the domain of a relation Ê (either or Ê´ µ) is clear from the context, we will drop the superscript and write just Ú Ö´Êµ.
Since equivalence relations are naturally combined by intersection and compared by inclusion, we may ask what this means for the corresponding random variables. Return now to the relational definition of non-interference in Section 4. Given any equivalence relation Ë on Ê´ µ, it is easily seen that there is a coarsest possible equivalence relation on with respect to which satisfies non-interference. We denote this relation ½´Ë µ, defined thus:
The following lemma confirms that this is indeed the coarsest equivalence relation with the property we seek: integers with equal parity. The inverse image of Ë (illustrated on the left) relates pairs whose second components are equal and it is easily seen that this is the coarsest Ê such that
It is a straightforward consequence of the above correspondences and definitions that random variable Ú Ö ÓÙØ´Ë µ captures exactly the same information as Ú Ö Ò´ ½´Ë µµ:
We can now present quantitative flow in relational form for deterministic systems. The following theorem tells us that, to calculate an upper bound on the information flow through a function , it suffices to approximate an output observation with kernel Ë by an input observation with kernel Ê provided we can establish Ê µ Ë. In the next section we see how this can be applied in a concrete example in the second-order lambda calculus. 
Information flow and polymorphic types
In this section we illustrate how, combining Theorem 5.5 with the principle of parametricity, polymorphic types can be used to derive bounds on information flow which are valid for all lambda terms sharing the type. The second-order lambda calculus [14, 15, 28] (also known as System F) extends the type language of the simply typed calculus with type variables and a universal quantifier and extends the term language with abstraction over type variables and application to types. The syntax is standard and we do not reproduce it here. For convenience, we use a syntax extended with useful base types (such as the integers ÒØ and Booleans ÓÓÐ) and list types Ì for each type Ì (no new theory is required as all these types are definable in the calculus). In examples, we omit explicit types from terms and elide the application of terms to types (in fact, our examples all stay within the Hindley-Milner fragment [18, 24, 10] , for which principal types may always be inferred). We refer to functions definable in the second-order lambda calculus as 2 functions.
Parametricity
The key to the results of this section is Reynolds' relational treatment of parametric polymorphism [28] , as applied to specific functions [43] . In Reynolds' treatment, each term is given an essentially standard funtional semantics whereas each type Ì is given a relational interpretation Ì . Reynolds shows that, in such models (e.g. Frame models [3, 25] 
This is known as relational parametricity. In the following we give a quick summary of Wadler's presentation [43] . The relational interpretation of basic types is the identity relation on the semantics of those types;
ÓÓÐ is for example interpreted by Á ÓÓÐ ÓÓÐ ¢ ÓÓÐ .
The relational interpretation of is that functions are related if they map related arguments to related values. Thus´ To give a relational interpretation of we start by considering a function from relations to relations (these are intended as relations over the universe of types in a frame model) ´ µ, i.e. for any relation 
Calculating bounds on flows
In the remainder of this section we present two examples showing how the relational interpretation of types can be exploited to derive both upper and lower bounds on information flow through functions with polymorphic types. In both examples, bounds are derived which hold for all functions with the given polymorphic type. In the examples we implicitly treat each function of interest as a deterministic transformational system. This involves restricting the functions (which, in full generality, are defined over infinite domains) to some finite input set of interest and then specifying a distribution on that set in the form of a random variable with range . For simplicity, we consider only observers with no prior knowledge of the inputs and we assume the input and output observations to be the identity, i.e. the observer can see the whole output and we measure the total flow of information from the whole input. Formally then, the flows we consider have the form ´id idµ, with a constant function. Applying Proposition 3.1 shows that this reduces to À´ AE µ. We slightly abuse the notation, writing this more suggestively as ´ ´ µµ.
Example: the map family
Recall the map function with type « ¬ ´« ¬µ « ¬
By the map family we mean the set of all 2 functions sharing this type. The map function itself maps a function over a list, thus:
Consider that we have a secret of some primitive type and a program which attempts to guess its value by evaluating for some value . Note that even the outcome Ð× reveals some information about the secret, since it narrows down the possibilities. However, if the possible values of form a large, uniformly distributed set, a single guess reveals only a small amount of information. This is essentially the example of attempting to guess a PIN number: if there are sufficient digits and PIN numbers are well distributed, a guess is highly unlikely to succeed and leaves the set of possible values almost (but not quite) unchanged.
We can use map in two ways to iterate the basic guessing program:
1. Given a list of secrets Ð as input, we can try a given guess on all of them by mapping´ µ over Ð: Ð map´ µ Ð. 2. Given a secret as input, we can test it against a fixed list of guesses by mapping´ µ over the list:
Here we consider just the first iteration (though the second gives essentially the same results, the form of reasoning is closer to that used in the fold example -see below). In what follows we derive results which allow us to place an upper bound on the amount of information revealed. Concretely, for secrets drawn from a set of ¾ ¿¾ possibilities, each with equal probability, and for lists of one million elements, the information flowing through Ð map´ µ Ð is less than ¼ ¼½ bits. Moreover, parametricity immediately generalizes this result to all similar programs Ð ´ µ Ð using other members of the map family. For the remainder of this section, let be any member of the map family. We assume all lists of secrets input to the program to have the same length, Ò and we assume their elements to be chosen independently from a finite set. We may thus assume Á Ë to have the 
(A derivation is given in [5] but, in fact, it turns out to be just a special case of Fano's inequality [9] .)
At first sight, this seems to promise a lower bound, rather than an upper bound, on À´ 
Example: the fold family
In the previous example, note that we needed a lower bound on À´ µ to derive an upper bound on À´ ¼ µ. Thus, when analysing quantitative flows, we may need to be able to derive lower bounds for flows through sub-programs, even if we are interested overall only in upper bounds (as in the case of security, for example).
In this example we show how parametricity can be used to establish that all members of the fold family (see below) preserve a lower-bound information flow property of addition. Recall the function foldr with type « ¬ ´« ¬ ¬µ « ¬ ¬
By the fold family we mean the set of all 2 functions sharing this type. The foldr function itself is defined such that, for any ¬: 
We will use the specific properties of foldr to derive a property which holds for all members of the fold family. In the remainder of this section let be any such function.
Consider an application such as ´·µ Ð, where Ð is a constant list of integers. What can we say about the flow ´ ´·µ Ð µ? The Data Processing theorem [9] states that the information obtainable from the outputs of a deterministic system cannot exceed that obtainable from its inputs. Thus we know that ´ ´·µ Ð µ À µ (6.5) where is the random variable corresponding to the integer input. This leaves open the possibility that entropy is lost; we will show that it is not.
As shown by Theorem 5. This is the route we take to showing that (6.5) can be strengthened to an equality. First we show that foldr in particular preserves 'post fixpoint' properties of the form Ê ½´Ê µ. PROOF. As shown in [43] (Section 3.6), parametricity ensures the following equation, for arbitrary ¬, Ð:
´¬µ Ð foldr´¬μ ´ µ Ð µ where´ µ and are the list 'cons' operator and empty list, respectively. Since ´ µ Ð is a list uniquely determined by Ð, the result follows immediately from the lemma.
From the proposition it follows easily that ´ ´·µ Ð µ À´ µ. The key observation is that ´ ´·µ Ð µ À´ µ if´ ´·µ Ðµ is injective. But´· µ is injective, for all , and, in general, is injective iff Id ½´I dµ, so the proposition applies.
Conclusions
We have defined a quantitative measure of information flow, ´ µ as the information theoretic quantity Á´ Ò ÓÙØ Ò µ, sufficiently general to account for flows in finite-domain systems featuring probabilistic non-determinism. For deterministic systems we have proved that, in the special case when completely determine the input, this quantity is the same as the simpler À´ ÓÙØ Ò µ and that in this context the flow into separate components of the output can safely be calculated one component at a time.
We have shown how equivalence relations can be interpreted as random variables when calculating Shannon's information measures and that this simple insight reveals strong relationships between our approach and non-interference. In particular, we have shown that, in the above-mentioned special case, non-interference is equivalent to a form of conditional probabilistic independence.
Finally, we have shown how Reynolds' notion of relational parametricity can be used to derive upper and lower bounds on information flows for families of functions sharing the same polymorphic type in the second order lambda calculus.
Future work along the lines of this paper will develop the relational approach in an effort to quantify information flows for richer languages and more sophisticated models of observation (for example, the threads-based language and the use of probabilistic bisimulation described in [32] ). In view of the use of parametricity in Section 6, recent work by Tse and Zdancewic [38] suggests that there may be interesting connections with Abadi et al.'s dependency calculus [1] .
Although security was the original motivation for this work, it may not be the only application of interest for quantitative analysis of information flow. Other possibilities may appear, such as measuring propagation of meaning in models of natural language, measuring the tightness of coupling between parallel components of a system, or even as a guide to computing optimal fixed points in security related program analyses [12] .
